Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1985

United States v. James
Lewis F. Powell Jr

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Water Law Commons

Recommended Citation
United States v. James. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 129. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

L-~ ~ ~~

r:J_

~

t-t_~~~
~;-~~~~~
~~)
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United States

Cert to @_ (en bane) (Reavley,
Clark, Goldoerg, Rupin, Politz,
Randall, T~te, Johnson, Williams; /
Gee~ diss., Garwo'od, Jolly,
v:;
Davis, Hitl; Higginbotham, diss.)
Federal/Civil
Timely

Gf

v.
James et al.
claimant)

1.

(FTCA

SUMMARY:

Does Section 3 of the Flood Control Act of 1928,

33 U.S.C. §702c give the United States absolute immunity where there
would otherwise be liability under the Federal Tort Claims

u.s.c.

§§2671-80 for personal injury

l1u- mel!U.0 - w rlh;rl cLt ~ ( tkcd- su_}l
'I Yrl VJ!lAbtVi -u_

·nu_ 6o

~ct,

28

esulting from government em-

- 2 ployees' negligent failure to warn of government-created hazards to
known recreational users?
2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

In the first of these con-

solidated cases, the Corps of Engineers discharged water through the
Millwood Dam in Arkansas, a federal flood control project.
lent current was created near the dam.

No signs warned of the dan-

ger and government personnel knew that buoys,
vices, had broken away.

A vio-

used as warning de-

James and Butler, who were skiing nearby,

were pulled by the strong current and injured.

Attempting to rescue

his wife, Butler's husband dove into the water and drowned.

After a

bench trial, the DC awarded damages, but concluded that section 702c
barred

plaintiffs'

recovery

because

the

injuries

resulted

from

floodwaters related to a flood control project.
In the second case, Clardy and his son were fishing in a bayou
in Louisiana.

The bayou is part of a flood control project.

faded warning signs were
structure.

located at

Two

the entrance of the drainage

Government employees opened the gates of the structure,

resulting in a strong current that swept the Clardys and their boat
near the structure.

~hat

was when they first saw the warning signs.

The son drowned while being
of the drainage structure.

pulle~

by the current through a barrel

The DC entered summary judgment for the

government, holding that the government had immunity under section
702c.
Under section 702c,
the United States

"No liability of any kind shall attach to

for

any damage

from or

by floods or flood

waters at any place," provided that if on any of the banks of the
Mississippi River

it is "impracticable to construct levees, either

- 3 -

because such construction is not economically justified or because
such construction would unreasonably restrict
then the government must

the floo<l channel,"

institute proceedings "to acquire either

the absolute ownership of the lands so subjected to overflow damage
or floodage rights over such lands."l
CAS found the statutory language ambiguous.
for

instance,

'floodwaters.'
indeed,

that
Nor

it

is evident what constitutes a

is the word

is it clear why

tence •••• "

After

"We do not think,

'damage'

'at any place'

'flood'

quite unequivocal.

or
Nor,

was tacked on to the sen-

reviewing the legislative history, CAS concluded

that the disclaimer of

immunity was directed solely at flooding.

Congress shifted most of the risks and costs of flooding onto localities and private owners.

CAS found it doubtful that Congress in-

tended to shield the negligent or wrongful acts of government employees.

1

The full language is:
No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the
United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at
any place: Provided, however, that if in carrying out the
purposes of sections 702a, 702b to 702d, 702e to 702g, 702h,
702i, 702j, 702k, 7021, 702m and 704 of this title it shall be
found that upon any sl:retch of the banks of the Mississippi River
it is impracticable to construct levees, either because such
construction is not economically justified or because such
construction would unreasonably restrict the flood channel, and
lands in such stretch of the river are subjected to overflow and
damage which are not now overflowed or damaged by reason of the
construction of levees on the opposite banks of the river it
shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of
Engineers to institute proceedings on behalf of the United States
Government to acquire either the absolute ownership of the lands
so subjected to overflow damage or floodage rights over such
lands •

..

- 4 In interpreting the provision, most courts have cited only the
general disclaimer stating that no liability shal 1 attach for any
flood damage at any place.

They have misconstrued it to grant immu-

nity in the "broadest and most emphatic language."
Co.

v.

United States,

u.s.

967

6B7

(CAlO 197B);

(1954).

210 F.2d 263,

270

National Mfg.

(CAB), cert. denied,

347

See also Callaway v. United States, 56B F.2d 6B4,
Parks v.

United States,

370 F.2d 92

But see Peterson v. United States, 367 F.2d 271, 276

(CA2 1966).

(CA9 1966)

(no

immunity when governmental action was wholly unrelated to any act of
Congress authorizing expenditures of

federal funds

for

trol); Hayes v. United States, 5B5 F.2d 701 (CA4 197B)

flood con(restricting

immunity to management of the water only if the purpose of flood
control is thereby served) •
In the other appellate cases in which 702c was considered, 21
of the 23 cases were brought to recover damages to property.
other

2 decisions did

injury liability.

not

immunize

In Wright v.

the government

United States,

(CAlO 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. B24

The

from personal

56B F.2d 153, 155

(197B), brought as a wrong-

ful death action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the government
asserted §702c as a defense, but the court held the government immune on other grounds.
(CAB 1977),

In Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221

an action for

damage

to property and personal injury

(including death), the court did not decide the §702c question.
~he

immunity should apply to the fault of government employees

in controlling floodgates or managing lands to contain floods or
floodwaters.

Because of

§702c,

the

government's

acts

to store,

divert, and release waters to further flood control are subject to

- s no risk of liability.

"If, however, the government allows people to

come upon those waters or nearby shores for purposes of recreation,
section 702c grants no immunity for government fault in creating a
danger or in failing to warn of danger to the public.

If a produc-

ing cause of the damage or injury is a government employee's negligence

in omissions or commissions that diverge from acts strictly

for the purpose of controlling floods or floodwaters, and the presence or movement of water

for

flood control purposes merely fur-

nishes a condition of the accident, there is no seciton 702c immunity."

The James and Butler case is reversed, and the Clardy case is

reversed and remanded for further factfinding.
Judge Gee dissented, saying that the majority ignored the plain
words of the statute.

Further, the majority's holding is unclear.

The government here was releasing water to further
which should protect it under the majority's ruling.

flood control,
But then the

majority goes on to say that if such release creates a danger or if
the government fails to warn of one, and someone is injured, then
the government is liable.

All the precedents, including in CAS, go

the other way.
,Judge Higginbotham dissented.

There is no clear evidence about

what Congress intended to do in §702c, so the court should defer to
the longstanding and unanimous contruction placed on it.

The task

of changing such a settled construction at this point should be left
to Congress.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

The SG contends that CAS's decision radically

departs from the construction of §702c given by every other appellate decision interpreting the statute, and is contrary to both the

- 6 plain language and the purpose of the provision.

The decision will

likely result in the imposition of substantial monetary liability on
the government due to the

large number of flood control projects.

CAS's interpretation conflicts with the plain language of the statute and with Congress' purpose.
Resps Butler

and James contend that CAS's

interpretation is

consistent with the wording of the statute, its historical context
and the legislative history.

Resp Clardy contends that the legisla-

tive history shows that the immunity was not intended to cover consequential damages or damages for personal injuries.
4.

DISCUSS ION:

Although CAS's decision certainly conflicts

with the emphasis in the decisions of other CAs, there is no sharp
conflict because no other CA has granted the government
under

this statute for

personal

i nj ur ies.

immunity

Although as Judge Gee

pointed out, there may be some conceptual problems with the application of CAS's rule, the rule is defensible, and the Court could let
other CAs react

to

it.

Judging

from the

2 3 prior cases and the

language of the statute, the immunity is more frequently invoked in
the context of

property damage.

Since CAS's rule

is limi. ted to

personal injury, it is not clear that liability will be a big problem for the government.

I do not think that the Court should sum-

marily reverse, because that would mean accepting the settled interpretation not necessarily because it is right, but mainly because it
is settled.
S.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend denial.

There are two responses.
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MEMO TO Mike:
This

case

government
Claims

involves

floodwaters

for

injuries

from

federal

different such projects

the

important

question

immunity from damages under

Act

cases:

an

ar~

caused
flood

Drainage

to

the Federal Tort

by

the

control

release

projects.

of
Two

involved in these consolidated

the Millwood Dam and Reservoir

Courtableau

as

Struction,

in Arkansas,
a

flood

and

control

project in Louisiana - both operated by the Army Corps of
Engineers.
Members of the Butler family were water-skiing on the
Millwood

Reservoir

when

the

project

was

"in

a

flood

control status", and water was being discharged from the
reservoir through the gates of the dam - water previously
"entrapped as part of the flood control
facility".

the

Respondent James and Butler were water-skiing

when the current created by discharge of the water

from

the reservoir pulled them through the dam's gates.

They

were

J•

function of

injured

and

Mrs.

Butler's

husband

was

drowned

2.

\

;

attempting
accident
project
water

to

assist

occurred

on

his
the

A

wife.

Courtableau

somewhat
Drainage

similar
Struction

in Louisiana when gates were opened because the
level

"would

have

caused

flood

conditions".

Respondents were fishing when their boat was caught in the

--------- ----.,

current created by the open drainage gates, overturned and
·----...,___...--.,...,_._ ·~ -···- ----

Kenneth Clardy was drowned.
The

suits

were

brought

against

the

United

States

government under the Tort Claims Act, alleging willful and
.-~

gross neglect by the government
notify

people,

using

the

in failing adequately to

reservoirs

for

recreational

purposes, of the danger.
The question presented is the correct interpretation
of §702 (c)

of

the Flood Control Act of 1928 provides in

pertinent part:
"No liability of any kind shall attach to
or rest upon the United States for any damages
from or by floods or flood waters at any place."
The
although

DCs

in

finding

negligence,

the

Arkansas

that

concluded

case

and

Louisiana

the government had
that

it

was

cases,

been guilty of

immunized

by

§702 (c)

from liability for damage caused by the release of flood
waters.

The

cases

were

consolidated

on

appeal,

and

a

3.

t.flt;'

-

panel of CAS affirmed.
had

been

interpreted

/

to

f'>~Y'~

It held that §702(c) consistently
bar

the

imposition of

liability

upon the government for damages related to flood control
projects.
The full Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, reversed
the DC's judgments by a
the

en

§702{c)

bane

court's

where

the

vote of 5 to 6.

decision,
injured

creating
persons

The essence of
an

were

exception

to

engaged

in

recreational activities and the government failed to warn
of the danger

resulting

from flood waters,

is summarized

in the court's opinion as follows:
"The government is not liable for any fault
of its employees in controlling floodgates or
managing lands to contain, prevent, or manage
floods or floodwaters.
This immunity, however,
does not extend to the fault of government
employees in failing to warn the public of the
existence of hazards to their accepted use of
government-impounded
water,
or
near6y · land.
Because of section 702c, the government's acts
to store, divert, and release waters to further
flood
control
are
subject
to
no
risk
of
1 iabil i ty.
If, however, the government allows
people to come upon ~ those waters or nearby
s ~es of recreation, section 702c
g rants
no i mmunity ~ for government f -ault in
creat1ng a
anger or 1n
aiiing to warn of
danger to the public.
If a producing cause of
the damage or injury is a government employee's
negligence
in omissions or commissions that
diverge from acts strictly for the purpose of
controlling
floods
or
floodwaters,
and
the
presence or movement of water for flood control

·<,

4.

purposes merely furnishes a condition of the
accident, there is no section 702c immunity."
Judge Gee, joined by 4 other circuit judges, wrote a
stinging

dissent

in

which

he

accused

the

majority

concluding that when Congress enacted §702(c)

of

it "did not

mean what until today every court that has considered its
language has concluded it did mean to say."
3ia: -- - Judge
separate

Higginbotham,

dissent,

assumed

in

a

that

the

brief

See Pet. p.
two-paragraph

majority

could

find

"ambiguity in the language of §702(c)", but relied on the
fact

that whatever

Congress may

have

intended

in

1928,

over the intervening years there has been a "long-standing
and unanimous construction placed on §702(c) by this court
---------~

[CAS ] and other courts - a construction which has given

------------------

specific and unambiguous content to the clause."
Judge

Higginbotham

mentioned,

the

SG

did
in

his

not

cite

brief

beginning at p. 32 of the brief.

does

the
this

Although

decisions

he

persuasively

The SG also argues that

the legislative history "confirms that §702 (c)

should be

interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning."
On

its

face

the opinions of the dissenting

judges,

and certainly the plain language of §702(c), would support
reversal.
/

Yet, it is fair to say that the brief filed by

5.

respondents -

in which the washington firm of Onek, Klein

& Farr had a hand in writing - makes a strong case for the
construction

and

I

say

that

majority

the

it

of

the

reasoning

argues

that

of

of

property

Valley

that

rights

the

in

the

government

lower
would

connection with its flood control plan."

Court

of

respondents

the

legislation was concerned only with

amount

River

the

It over

when

control

by

""" simplies

Appeals.
brief

adopted

1928
the

flood

"nature

Mississippi
acquire

in

Respondents say

the government was not concerned with damage suits based
in

recreational

activities on the waters of these projects.

The immunity

on

by

negligence

engaged

persons

provision of §702(c) was added to provide the government a
measure of

control
That

commitments.

over

the

magnitude

section was

of

intended

its
to

financial

protect

the

government from damages to property that would not rise to
the

level

compensation
further

of

under

argue

prohibiting

a

that

ordinary

constitutional
the

Fifth

even
tort

if

Amendment) •
702(c)

claims

for

(requiring

taking

can

Respondents
be

read

as

negligently caused

damages, it has no applicability to the facts of this case
because

respondents 1

claims

arise

from

the

government 1 s

6.

mismanagement of recreational activities that have nothing
------------____...........~~~~-

to do with flood control.
!'""--

.,_______._,.

Pursuing
states

that

occasioned
control
risk

this

line

their
by

clients

the

activities,

with

of

respect

argument,
assumed

respondents
risk

of

losses

government's

mishandling

of

flood

but

"did

assume

to

losses

not

the

brief

caused

any
by

comparable

recreational

activities or other conduct neither related nor necessary
to flood control."

( Br. 9) .

*
I

would

1 ike

a

One's sympathy would

*

bobtail

*
bench

memo

from my

clerk.

tend to support affirmance, whereas

clearly the language of

§702 (c)

is about as explicit as

one could write it to preclude liability by the government
for activities under the Flood Control Act under any and
all

circumstances.

Judge

Higginbotham's

construction 1928,

a

change

Moreover,
view

there

is

in

light

that

a

great
of

the

deal

uniform

particularly by courts of appeals in

this

construction

Congress and not made by the judiciary.
LFP, JR.

should

be

to

since

left

to

BENCH MEMORANDUM
No. 85-434, United States v. James
(To be argued Monday, April 21st)

I.

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

Whether those engaging in recreation who suffered personal injury
caused by flood-control waters may recover under the Federal Tort
Claims Act even though the Flood Control Act specifies that "[n]o
liability of any kind shall attach to ••. the United States for
any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place," 33
u.s.c. §702c?
II.

FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOH

See attached pool memo.
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III.

DISCUSSION

u.s.

Section 702c of title 33 of the

Code provides:

"No liability of any kind shall attach to or
rest upon the United Statues for any damage
from or by floods or flood waters at any
place: Provided, however, That if in carrying
out the purposes of [various other sections
of the title] it shall be found that upon any
stretch of the banks of the Mississippi River
it is impracticable to construct levees •.• ,
and lands in such stretch [will be newly]
subjected to overflow and damage .•• by reason of the construction of levees on the opposite banks of the river it shall be the
duty of the ••• United States Government to
acquire either the absolute ownership of the
lands so subjected to overflow and damage or
floodage rights over such lands."
This provision was passed in 1928.

1.

Just Don't Ask Us About Philadelphia Gear, Okay?: The Govern-

ment's Position

The
statute.

government's

argument

is

easy

to

summarize:

read

the

A personal-injury suit is brought for damages, and is

thus for "any damage."

The waters causing the injury here were

flowing because of the government's effort to reduce the possibility of flooding, and were thus "flood waters."
was a place, and thus was "any place."
"[n] o
United

liability of
States."

any

kind

Sovereign

Under these conditions,

shall attach

immunity

waived, but expressly preserved.

is

The reservoir

to or

therefore

rest upon the
not

only not

-

I

find

argument.

3 -

it somewhat difficult to comment on the government's
They quote the statute correctly, and their interpre-

tation accords with my understanding of words like "any."

Clear-

ly, then, the respondents "bear the burden" of showing that this
statute should not be taken at face value.

2.

Did Chief Justice Marshall Decide Marbury Just By Reading the

Statute?: The Respondents' Position

The respondents' argument is, of necessity, more subtle than
the government's position.

It consists of three separate attacks

seeking to undermine the government's plain-meaning argument.

a.

Structure and Pre-Enactment History
The respondents'

first argument is that §702c is simply a

part of a compromise on how much property the government was to
acquire in connection with its flood-control activities, and is
therefore

not

about

any other

kind of

immunity.

According

to

respondents, one side in the legislative struggle wanted compensation to owners for all manner of damages or costs involved in
the start-up of the program, while the other side wanted to pay
out only to the extent required to do so by the Takings Clause.
The proviso of §702c, which treats land affected by levees on the
opposite
purhcase

bank,
certain

and

§702d,

"flowage

which

rights"

commits
on

the

government

property near

the

to

river,

were the extent of the government's committment to compensation;

- 4 -

the pre-proviso portion of §702c simply emphasizes that the government is not liable for any other damages.
As part of this argument, respondents also place some weight
on the fact that, in 1928, the fact that the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA) was almost 20 years in the future meant that the government in 1928 had immunity against personal-injury suits even
if Congress hadn't

said

so

in §702c.

Resps

argues that §702c

would therefore be superfluous if it were interpreted as barring
personal-injury suits.
Respondents' argument on this point strikes me as an excellent explanation of why Congress might have chosen to place the
immunity provision where it did, but I do not see it as explaining decisively what Congress meant by what

it put there.

The

choice of language is difficult to square with anything except an
intention to exempt the broadest possible scope of outcomes from
those for

which the government might otherwise be liable.

The

statute doesn't immunize the government from liability for "property damages," for example, but from "any damage," and therefore
the respondent's argument that compensation for property was all
that §702c was meant to reach falls short.

Similarly, the stat-

ute prevents the imposition of "liability of any kind" upon the
government, not "liability for flooded property."
In addition, there is at least one sense in which the respondents'

argument

prove

too

much.

Respondents

implicitly

thinks that all Congress was concerned about in passing §702c was
what

would

happen

to

property

immediately

after

flood-control

projects were constructed--under respondents' view, property that

- 5 -

got flooded was not to be paid for by the government except when
the flooding resulted in a constitutional taking or fell within
the proviso.

But the courts, at least, have also interpreted the

statute to cover what happens when, with flood-control measures
long

in place,

there

whelmed by nature.

is damage

when

In other words,

those

measures

are

over-

the courts have not inter-

preted the measure as covering only damage to property from the
construction of the

levees and dams,

despite the fact that re-

spondents' arguments would so limit §702c immunity.
As to the argument that the 1928 no-FTCA backdrop would make
§702c superfluous if interpreted to cover personal injury, there
seems to me a slight flaw in respondents' logic.

If the govern-

ment argued that the immunity provision was designed only to cover

personal

point.

injuries,

then

respondents

would

have

a

telling

But the government argues that the government intended to

forestall lots of suits, among those suits for personal injury.
Under respondents'

view of inferring congressional intent, a po-

sition like the petitioner's could prevail only if Congress were
prescient: Congress would have to say something like, "We want to
immunize
later

the government

from

all suits,

and even if we pass a

statute generally waiving liability with respect to some

subset of suits [e.g., torts], we still want to immunize government from all suits resulting from floods or flood waters."
This way of
does,

however,

looking

at

respondents'

superfluity argument

lead me to a different, and perhaps more useful,

way of thinking about the case.

Assume that, whether because of

the prevailing state of sovereign immunity or because of a flood-

- 6 -

specific desire, the 1928 Congress contemplated that, after §702c
was passed, there would be no governmental liability for personal
injuries

stemming

from

floods

or

flood-control

waters.

It

is

historical fact that the 1948 Congress then came along and passed
the FTCA, which provides:
"The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to
tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances, but shall not be liable
for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages."
28 u.s.c. §2674.

u.s.c.

See also 28

§1346(b)

(giving federal district courts ex-

elusive jurisdiction on claims "for

injury or loss of property,

or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of

any employee of the Government while acting

within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant

in accordance with the law of the place where the

act or omission occurred").

The 1948 Congress therefore seems to

have contemplated a generalized waiver of governmental immunity
from personal-injury suits.
In addition, while the FTCA does have an entire section on
exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity
tire
after

section
passage

actions of

setting
of

forth

the FTCA)

the TVA,

see 28

what
for

remains
such

u.s.c.

mention flood-control activities.

immune

things

(that is, an enfrom suit even

as quarantines and

§2680, this section does not
One might infer from this si-

lence that, even if the 1928 Act was intended to give the US immunity from suits for personal injury caused by flood waters, the

- 7 -

1948 Congress,

in enacting the FTCA and omitting any mention of

flood-control activities, did intend to waive the immunity of the
United States in cases like this one.
Finally,

the FTCA excepts

"discretionary

functions"

from

the waiver, and an accompanying committee report states:
"This is a highly important exception, intended to preclude any poss ibi 1 i ty that the
bill might be construed to authorize suit for
damages against the Government growing out of
an authorized activity, such as a flood control or irrigation project, where no negligence on the party of any Government agent is
shown
"
H. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5-6 (1946).
Respondent argues that this passage suggests that liability for
non-discretionary functions might exist for flood-related activities by the government, since the passage states that the discretionary-functions exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity
is designed to safeguard flood-control activities from liability,
and therefore implies that some liability exists. _
Respondents'
it.

If a

position therefore has a good deal going for

later Congress comes along and does something incon-

sistent with an earlier Congress, the later Congress is generally
presumed to know the background against which it legislates, and
might therefore be presumed to have intended to overrule the previous state of affairs.

Nonetheless, even this sensible view is

probably not the most directly applicable legal principle here:
"It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statute
dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged

[!] by a later enacted statute covering a mre generalized

spectrum."

Radzanower

v.

Touche Ross

&

Co.,

426

u.s.

148, 153

- 8 -

(1976).

So if "flood control" is a "narrow, precise, and specif-

ic subject," then the FTCA's generalized provisions waiving immunity against personal-injury suits do not override §702c's provision

setting

control.
least

forth

immunity

against

all

suits

involving

flood

Nonetheless, respondents' case still breathes, since at

§702c

was

not

by

its

terms

only

about

personal-injury

suits.
I note also that the FTCA is a waiver of sovereign immunity,
and such waivers are to be construed narrowly.

If one adopts the

converse of this proposition and construes broadly statutes setting forth

immunity, then you have even more weight in the bal-

ance pan on the goverment's side.

b.

If Ketchup Is A Vegetable , Maybe Water Skiers Are Mini-Dams

The second and related argument of respondents is that, for
the

legislative~context

reasons set forth as supporting respond-

ents' first argument, §702c has nothing to do with injuries arising from recreational activities.
The first sub-argument here notes the "fundamental principle of immunity doctrine that the sphere of protected [governmental]

activity must be narrowly limited by the purpose for which

the immunity was granted."
ler 9.

This statement, of course, is exactly backwards:

fundamental
governmental
limited.

Brief for Respondents James and But-

principle
activity

of

immunity doctrine

~rotected

by

Express waiver is necessary.

that

the

immunity must be

it is a

sphere of
narrowly

I think, therefore, that

-

9 -

the Court is obliged to interpret broadly a stutute setting forth
immunity
terms.

with

a

generous

helping

of

sweeping

"any"'s

in

its

The exclusion of recreational activities from the mind of

Congress when its voice was so clear does not, therefore, seem to
me much help to petitioners.
The second sub-argument here is made by respondent Clardy,
who points to some precedents holding the government liable when
a facility with both flood-control and other purposes has led to
the damages at issue, and then concludes that the mere involvement of a flood-control facility in the proceeding does not immunize the government from suit.

Since recreation is a non-flood-

control purpose of the facility involved here, and since the government's encouragement of

recreation

led to the

injuries suf-

fered here, the government is liable.
I would find
ernment inspector,
respondents

had

this argument much more convincing if a govputt-putting out on the lake

used

federally

acceptable

to see whether

levels

of

water-ski

wax, had negligently left a huge trail of red tape in his or her
wake

in

drowned.

which

a

hapless

But here

swimmer

became

entangled

and

then

it is impossible to argue that flood-control

waters were not the cause of the injury, and therefore §702c has
to apply to the situation here if it is applicable to any personal

injuries.

If

the government stated that it was immune from

all injuries caused by postal trucks, and someone on the way into
the Post Office to buy stamps got hit by a postal truck, would
the government be liable?

The sale of stamps by the government

may be a but-for cause of the accident, but so is the truck;

I

- 10 -

have no trouble concluding that the government is immune so long
as the condition that it lists in the statute is a but-for cause
of the accident even if it is not the only but-for cause of the
Whether other governmental action is also a but-for

accident.

cause of the accident is a matter of happenstance, not liability.

c.

When Congress Wanted To Limit Something to the Mississippi

River Valley, They Knew How To Spell "Mississippi"
Respondents'

third argument is that, whatever §702c says,

that section does not apply to the particular reservoir at issue
with respect to respondents James and Butler.

{This third argu-

ment is not made by respondent Clardy, whose husband and son were
injured by waters from a different project than that where James
and Butler were hurt.)
act

of

1928

Valley;
jured is

Section 702c is part of the flood-control

that authorized projects

in

the Mississippi

River

the Millwood Reservoir where James and Butler were
in the Red-Ouachita River Basis project authorized

the 1946 Flood Control Act,
cluded within

inin

and the Millwood Reservoir was in-

that project in

the 1958 Act.

that §702c was only needed for

Respondents argue

the Mississippi projects because

only there was the government taking on any possibility of property-damage liability and thus only there was there the need to
disclaim liability beyond that set forth in the §702c proviso and
§702d.

{I

note

that

it

is

unclear whether

respondents raised

this argument below.)
Respondents also argue
immunity provisions

that there are different,

narrower

in a 1936 Act that would be superfluous if

- 11 -

§702c applied in all its breadth to all flood-control projects.
Respondent acknowledges that the 1936 Act states that it "shall
[not] be construed as repealing or amending any provision of [the
1928 Flood Control Act]," 33
that projects on

u.s.c.

the Mississippi

§70le, but this simply means

are not affected

by the 1936

Act, not that the 1928 Act applies to the projects authorized in
the 1936 Act.

In addition, the 1946 Act does not have any lan-

guage similar to §70le, and thus even if projects authorized by
the 1936 Act are

subject to §702c there

is no reason to think

that projects authorized by the 1946 Act are subject to §702c.
I

think

that

the

fact that the 1946 Act has no

immunity

provisions in it is quite consistent with §702c being a generalized grant of immunity, since Congress would then not be obliged
to

repeat §702c over

And

and over.

as

the government's reply

brief states, §702c extends the immunity to flood waters "at any
place,"

not

just on

the Mississippi.

When Congress wanted

to

-

limit a provision to the Mississippi River projects, it said so,
as in the proviso of §702c itself.

The "narrower" provisions of

the 1936 Act are indeed narrower, since they apply by their terms
only to "damages due to the construction works" rather than to
flood

waters;

§702c's scope.

those

provisions

therefore

say

nothing

about

- 12 -

IV.

I
here,

think
and

that

therefore

broadest possible
setting

the

forth

a

RECOMMENDATION

plain

language

recommend

phrasing

for

governmental

of

§702c

reversal.
the

statute.

should

Congress
That

prevail

chose

the

statute

was

immunity and therefore should,

at

least if one can apply the converse of the normal rule that waivers of sovereign immunity are to construed narrowly, be construed
broadly even if its language were not so sweeping.
I

Nonetheless,

remain slightly worried by the later passage of the FTCA; per-

haps oral argument will clear up this last point.

Setear
April 15, 1986

5:03 PM

.. ,

.

~~

•

I
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VI.

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS

For the Petr:
1.
After Congress passed §702c governing damages resulting
from flood waters, it passed the Federal Tort Claims Act allowing
suits for personal injury?
Why shouldn't we give dispositive
weight to the later act of Congress here and therefore allow a
suit for personal injury?
For the Resp:
1. Why haven't you argued that the Federal Tort Claims Act
implicitly repealed §702c so far as personal injuries are concerned?
2.
Isn't the statutory language here awfully broad?
It
states that there shall be no liability of ~kind for ~dam
age at~ place. Why did Congress choose such sweeping terms if
it inte~d only narrow role you ascribe to §702c?
3.
If we accept your argument that §702c was only meant to
cover flooding that resulted from the construction of dams and
levees, wouldn't we be allowing recovery against the government
when there was damage from flood-control projects constructed
long ago?

mwm 04/19/86

BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:
From:

Mr. Justice Powell

April 19, 1986

Mike

No. 85-434 United States v. Charlotte James, et al.
Date: April 11, 1986

QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether
ability

of

any

33

u.s.c.

kind

§702c,

shall

which provides that

attach

to or

rest

upon

"[n]o lithe

United

States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any
place," bars respondents from recovering damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act for

injuries allegedly caused by the release

of flood waters from federal flood control projects.

DISCUSSION

,,
,.

...

,.

•

r-:~-

I

believe that

-·

it will be helpful to discuss the argu-

ments made by the parties, particularly si.nce the respondents are
not relying on the reasoning of the courts below.
1

I will proceed

in this discussion by presenting each argument of the SG followed
immediately by the resps' counter-argument, before presenting the
next argument of the SG.
1.

The Plain Language of the Statute
The SG's first,

and central argument

is that the plain

language of the statute clearly indicates that no liability shall
attack for injuries caused by the government's flood control activities.

It further contends that the injury in this case was

caused by release of flood waters, and therefore is barred by 33

u.s.c.

§702c, which retains federal sovereign immunity over "any

damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place."

In order

to make this argument, the SG goes no further than the language
of the statute, which on its face certainly does seem to bar this
claim.

He notes that "[w)hen . . . the terms of a statute [are]

unambiguous,
exceptional

judicial

inquiry

circumstances."

is

complete,

Rubin

v.

except

United

in

States,

rare
449

and

u.s.

424, 430 (1981).

See also Board of Governors v. Dimension Finan-

cial

84-1274

Corp.,

statute

No.

is clear

and

slip.

op.

unambiguous

6

(Jan.

• that

22,

1986)

("If

the

is the end of the mat-

ter.'")
The resps, particularly resps James and Butler (the Onek,
Klein brief) give two reasons for looking past the plain language
of

----the

statute.

The

first

is

that

§702c

is ambiguous because

within the same subsection, as well as other sections of the same

act, Congress provided for some forms of liability.

The proviso

of

of

§702c

rights.
age

provides

for

liability

for

acquisition

overflow

Section 702d committed the government to purchase "flow-

rights"

diversions

to certain properties located
the

near

proposed

Because these sections provide for
--------------------~4----some government liability almost "in the same breath" as §702c's

-----

from

in or

immunity provision,
-·.

river.

resps

_...--.....

contend

that

it

view §702c as providing absolute immunity.

is not necessary to
Therefore, resps con-

tend that the Court must look past the language of the statute in
order to determine

just how much

immunity Congress intended by

§702c.
For reasons that differ

from the SG' s argument,

---

clude that the language of the statute controls.
------------~~

I con-

Resps bear the

burden of overcoming the strong presumption that the straightforward language of the statute is not as broad as it appears.

The

proviso . of section 702c and the liability provision of §702d do
create some ambiguity.
are

unsuccessful

in

-

But resps, as I will demonstrate later,

creating

an

alternative

meaning

from-----------------~------------------the legislative history.
For that reason,

for

§702c

I conclude that

they have failed to rebut the presumption that the plain language
of the statute controls.

"The plain purpose of legislation

is determined in the first instance with reference to the plain
language of the statute itself."
at 12.

Dimension Financial,

Stated differently, resps have posited sufficient reason

c:--

for looking beyond the words of the statute.

""·".J0 of

slip op.

But, once the words

the statute are traversed, they do not present anything from

-

the legislative history that "point[s]

~· 0> I"
~~

unambiguously to the an-

~,

··,

·,:
,.

..

I•

'

7

.

,..

'.

swer" and therefore they have not met their burden of providing
"substantial support for limiting language that Congress itself
chose not to 1 imi t. "

St.

Paul Fire

&

Marine Insurance Co. v.

u.s. 531, 550 (1978).

Barry, 438

2. The Legislative History
Both sides make extensive arguments based on legislative
history.

Rather than attempting to set out in detail the support

for each side's legislative history argument, I will only summarize

their

Klein brief)

the

Onek,

argue that section 702c was drafted,

along

positions
first

briefly.

Resps

(particularly

with other provisions, as the House response to an overly generous provision in the Senate version of the bill.

Section 4 of

the Senate version would have required the United States to acquire ownership interest in a lot of land near the Mississippi,
including a great deal of land owned by railroads.

The House

rejected that version, and substituted its own, much more limited
requirements,

found

in

the proviso and

in §407d.

Resps argue

that §702c's immunity language was inserted as part of the House
effort to limit liability for property damage and property acquisition, and that it was only intended to ensure that "the government, and only the government, would determine how much of these
property rights
Klein Br. at 27.

to acquire,

and when to acquire them."

My own reading of the legislative

hist~

Onek,
indi-

------

cates that the immunity language of §702c was a completely separat e---,l,. . S,::-os::-:u=-=-e=--:;i~n=--7t;:h-:e~l:;-e:-g-:;i-:::s~l-=a t i ve debates from the p r ov i so and from

----The
§702d.

-

immunity language was not intended as a response to

the Senate version of the bill.

Its inclusion with amendments

r-J-

that were

--

intended to replace section 4 of the Senate bill was

just the sort of coincidence or fortuity that occurs all the time
in Congress.

The immunity language was passed unanimously with-

out discussion;

the proviso and section 702d both were hotly de-

bated.
Both the SG and the resps make a variety of arguments as
to

what

the

legislative

history

does

indicate.

For

example,

resps question why Congress would include an immunity provision
when existing law protected them with complete sovereign immunity.

The SG responds by noting

that Congress was simply being
~,

extra-cautious on the eve of an enormous undertaking; see
69 Cong. Rec. 7028 (1928)
vision

in

the

bill,

("While it is wise to insert that pro-

it

is

not

necessary,

because

the

Supreme

Court of the United States has decided • • • that the Government
is not liable for any of these damages."
ing);

see also Pet.

app.

35a n.4

(remarks of Rep. Spear-

(Gee, J., dissenting)

(noting

that Congress was simply "driving down a clear stake in such a
dangerous area").

I do not find any of the various explanations

of the legislative history very convincing, but the short answer,

-

as I noted above, is that resps bear the burden of demonstrating
that Congress intended something other than what it said in the
language of the statute.

I conclude that they have not met that

burden.
ts of causation
argue
control

activities,"

recreation facility

that

this

but
and

is

is not
merely

subject

truly damage
negligent

from

management

to liability under

"flood
of

a

the Federal

·.

Tort Claims Act.
ni ty for

I agree that the government cannot claim immu-

any and all activity that is merely associated wi

flood control project.

tJ

a

But the accidents here, in my view, were

sufficiently connected to the government's flood control responsibilities to come under the liability provision.
sort

of

ment' s

accident

flood

that

control

is

totally unconnected

efforts.

ran a marina and someone fell
dock,

If,

for

It was not the

from

example,

the govern- I

the government

through a negligently constructed

§702c would not make the government

immune from damages.

But in this case, the government had to make a decision whether
to release water from a dam.

It is not unusual in the West that

such decisions often involve protecting the integrity of the dam
structure itself.
1 i ttle

time

for

Such decisions also may have to be made with
warning.

While

in

this

there was adequate time to give warning,

case

it

appears

that

it nevertheless comes

within the general category of cases that are sufficiently causally related to flood control activities that the immunity provision

applies.

Resps pose difficult hypotheticals

the concept of causation to its limit.

that stretch

Those cases are not be-

fore the Court, however, and it is not surprising that the sometimes fuzzy concept of tort causation does not lend itself to a
bright line.
4. Is §702c limited to the 1928 Flood Control Act?
Resps make one argument that I find troubling.

They con-

tend that Congress only intended to apply §702c to the 1928 Flood

-=-

Control Act and subsequent amendments, and that the James/Butler
c:;_-

---=-

accident occurred on a reservoir that was not a part of the 1928

r:--J-

Act or any subsequent amendment.

. -

The SG argues that nothing in

the statute limits its application to the 1928 Act.

I find that

Statutes are not normally presumed to
have application outside the context of their enactment.
dition,

In ad-

resps point out that some subsequent flood control acts

had their own, slightly different immunity provisions.

I suggest

that this would be a fruitful area for questioning at oral argument.

I would like to reserve judgment on this issue until after

oral argument.
____.-?

CONCLUSION
It

is

unfortunate

that

the

government

would

insist on

cloaking itself with immunity from damages in these tragic cases
involving only small amounts of damages.

The government, howev-

er, has reason to fear that it could be liable for enormous damages in the future if it loses immunity for flood control activities.

At least as to flood control projects that come

1928 Act,
~

---------------I conclude that §702c preserves the

the

government's sover-

eign immunity from liability for any damages to resps •
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I
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recall,
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case was

believe,

u.s.

v. James
time

table

the end of

therefore,

forthcoming today!

May 20, 1986

that

a

for

producing

this week.
23-page

I

a

could

draft

was

Did you really attend the wedding in

Williamsburg, and - in view of your capital case plus this
opinion - did you get any sleep the last couple of nights?
Whatever the explanation, I do appreciate your moving with
"all deliberate speed", and I have now read the draft with
interest.
Apart
first
that

from some

stylistic editing,

13 pages are excellent.
beg ins on page

having

refreshed my

this case.

I

think

My problems with Part II

13, may result

in part from my not

recollection as to the arguments

Nevertheless,

as

the

in

those who read our opinion

will be even less familiar than I am, the draft should be
clearly understandable on its face.

I do not think Part

II quite measures up to this requirement.

.'''

.

2.

My

general

impressions

are

that

Part

II

is

unnecessarily long and to some extent perhaps repetitious.
It also seems to me that respondents'
to the "proviso" are confusing.

arguments relating

My "confusion" does not

commence, however, until the first paragraph on p. 16.

Up

to

my

that

point,

Part

II

is

fine.

As

suggested

by

.

scribbling in the margin on p. 16, it seems to me that the
second

and

omitted,

third

leaving

sentences
the

first

in

this

sentence

paragraph
on

p.

could
16

as

be
the

opening sentence in the paragraph that begins on p. 17.
You

address

the proviso of §702c,

for the first time on p. 18.

and §702d

From that point on,

it difficult to follow the draft.

I find

You have endeavored to

state fairly the arguments of both classes of respondents,
but my impression is that we could be fair without writing
at

such

length.

In

view

of

the

plain

language

and

legislative history, and your disposition of the ambiguity
argument,

there is little substance left to respondents'

arguments.
It would help,
subparts

containing

the

classes of respondents.

at least for me,
respective

if Part II had

arguments of

the

two

At the beginning of Part II, you

could - as I believe you have - state the common argument

-'·

with respect to the ambiguity of the statute.
although
arguments

there

is

some

seem

to

be made.

Thereafter,

overlapping,

somewhat

If

right,

I

am

different
this

would

justify the use of subparts as an aid to clarity.
Finally, responding to your inquiry as to whether
we should mention the argument by the Arkansas respondents
that §702
that

does

rejects

not apply to

this

them,

argument as

I

suggest a

briefly as

footnote

you can.

The

short answer to the argument is that the language of §702c
is not limited to the Louisiana dam, and that no decision
has ever so held.
assume

that

Moreover,

Congress

it would be unreasonable to

intended

a

different

level

of

liability at one of these projects from that which exists
at all others.

* * *
If

this memorandum seems

not so intend it.

unduly

negative,

I

do

I think you have "wrought a miracle" in

producing a draft so quickly, and it has been helpful for
me

to

have

it

early

this

week.

I

merely

suggest,

in

effect, that you now spend another day or two if necessary
in revising Part II with the view both to clarifying and
shortening it.

L.F.P., Jr.
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As you indicated to me in explaining your outline
of

the

facts,

one could understand why CA5

-

en bane -

struggled to find some way to avoid the plain language of
§702c.
Perhaps

at

the

end

of

our

opinion,

we

might

include some hortatory language along the following lines:
"As the facts

in this case demonstrate, one can

well understand why the Court of Appeals sought to find a
principled way of holding the Government responsible for
its concededly negligent conduct.
above,

we

obligated
section

nevertheless
to

of

follow
the

the
1928

For the reasons stated

conclude
plain
Act

that

language
that

the
of

Court
§702c

received

is
a

careful

consideration by Congress and that has remained unchanged
for nearly 60 years.

If a change is to be made, it should

be by the legislative rather than the judicial branch of
government."

i.

2.

Cabell:

Again

I

appreciate

your

moving

so

promptly to provide me with a first draft that gives us and me in particular - more adequate time to consider this
case and our opinion with care.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-434

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v.
CHARLOTTE JAMES ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June - , 1986]

JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the immunity provision in 33 U. S. C. § 702c, which states that "[n]o liability of
any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for
any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place,"
bars recovery where the Federal Government would otherwise be liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C.
§ 2671 et seq., for personal injury caused by the Federal Government's negligent failure to warn of the dangers from the
release of flood waters from federal flood control projects.
I
The present case arose from serious accidents at flood control projects in Arkansas and Louisiana. In both accidents,
recreational users of the reservoirs were swept through
retaining structures when those structures were opened to
release waters in order to control flooding.

A
The project in Arkansas, Millwood Dam, was dedicated in
1966 and is located in the southwestern corner of the State.
The Millwood Reservoir behind the structure is used for
fishing, swimming, boating, and water-skiing. This reservoir has marinas and launching areas for small boats. The
United States Government Printing Office has printed

-

85-434-0PINION
2

UNITED STATES v. JAMES

brochures that promote the recreational features of the
project and encourage the public to water-ski at the Millwood
Reservoir.
Enormous portals set within the Millwood Dam, called
"tainter gates," allow the discharge of water from the Reservoir into a spilling basin below. On June 8, 1979, the level of
the Reservoir was such that the United States Corps of Engineers designated it at "flood stage." As part of the flood
control function of the Millwood facility, the Corps of Engineers began to release water through the tainter gates.
This release created a swift, strong current toward the
underwater discharge.
Respondents Charlotte James and Kathy Butler, who were
water-skiing in that area because the water appeared to be
calm, fell and began drifting toward the tainter gates. Respondents' husbands, who were operating the ski boat, circled back to give them the tow lines, apparently intending to
pull them away from danger. Tr. 20-21, 166-167. Because
of the swift currents, respondents were unable to hold on to
the lines. Ibid. The husbands' attempts to pull respondents aboard by hand also failed because each time the current
pulled the skiers out of reach. I d., at 21. Eddy Butler then
dove into the water in an attempt to save his wife, but all
three were pulled through the tainter gates. He drowned,
and respondents James and Butler were injured. The boat,
still occupied by Mr. James and his daughter Sonja, became
lodged in the tainter gates, and the occupants were rescued
without injury.
Respondents James and Butler filed suit in the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U. S. C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. After a bench trial, the
court in an unreported opinion found that a cable strung with
orange buoys delineating the area of danger near the tainter
gates had broken and drifted away; that white anchor buoys
marking a restricted area near the Dam were also out of place

:
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and consequently offered no warning to a reasonably prudent
user; that the United States "knew that the dangerous condition created would result in injury to those situated as [were
respondents James and Butler] if an adequate warning was
not given"; and that respondents James and Butler were not
negligent. The court assessed damages at $1 million for respondent Butler, and $40,000 for respondent James, stating
that the case went "beyond gross negligence" and "constitute[d] a classic classroom example of a death and injuries
resulting from conscious governmental indifference to the
safety of the public." App. to Pet. for Cert. 66a. At the
same time, however, the court concluded that although Federal Government agents had willfully and even maliciously
failed to warn of a known danger, the Federal Government
was immune from damages under 33 U. S. C. § 702c, a statute left unrepealed by the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 60
Stat. 842, 846-847 (listing statutes specifically revoked by
FTCA). The court accordingly denied relief.
B
The relevant flood control project in Louisiana, the
Cortableau Drainage Structure, is located near the West
Atchafalaya Basin. On May 17, 1980, the waters in the reservoir of Bayou Courtableau Basin were at flood stage, and
consequently the Corps of Engineers opened the gates in the
project. This created a strong current. Kenneth Clardy
and his father, Joseph Clardy, were fishing in the Basin.
Only two faded signs at the entrance of the drainage structure warned of the dangerous current. The boaters could
not see the signs until they already had been swept past.
The boat became disabled and was drawn through the open
gates of the spillway. Kenneth Clardy was thrown into the
approach basin and drowned while being pulled through a
220-foot-long barrel of the drainage structure. 1 His father
'The District Court incorrectly identified Joseph Clardy as the decedent. App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a-61a.
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survived without injury.
Respondent Susan Clardy, Kenneth Clardy's wife, commenced an action in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana seeking damages under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that the Corps of Engineers failed to post adequate warnings of the danger from the
current caused by the open gates. The Federal Government
conceded that it negligently failed to warn the decedent.
The District Court found, however, that under Graci v.
United States, 456 F. 2d 20 (CA5 1971), and Florida East
Coast R. Co. v. United States, 519 F. 2d 1184 (CA5 1975), 2
the United States was immune under § 702c from damages
for personal injury caused by floods or flood waters in the
negligent operation of flood control projects. The court
found further that the Federal Government's action was
within the scope of § 702c because "the gates were opened to
prevent flooding and inundation landside of the drainage
structure." App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a. The court accordingly granted summary judgment for the United States.

c
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the
cases on appeal, and a panel affirmed. 740 F. 2d 365 (1984).
2
In Graci v. United States , 456 F. 2d 20 (CA5 1971), property owners in
Louisiana brought suit for flooding allegedly caused by negligent design in
the Mississippi River Gulf Channel Outlet, a navigation project that provided a shortcut from the Gulf of Mexico to New Orleans. The Federal
Government contended that § 702c granted immunity from damages caused
by any flood waters, even those unconnected with flood control projects.
The court rejected this argument, and held that the provision conferred
immunity only for floods or flood waters connected with a flood control
project.
In Florida East Coast Railway Co. v. United States , 519 F. 2d 1184
(CA5 1975), the court denied recovery to a railroad after its tracks near a
central Florida flood control project were washed out by heavy rains. The
court rejected arguments that the immunity provision did not cover losses
caused or aggravated by the Federal Government's own negligence, and
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The panel examined the legislative history of § 702c and concluded that Congress intended the provision to disclaim only
"liability for 'takings' and not liability for consequential damages." !d., at 373. Nevertheless, the panel affirmed both
judgments from the District Courts, believing itself bound by
the Circuit's earlier interpretation of the section in Graci,
supra, and Florida East Coast Railway, supra. See n. 2,
supra.
The Court of Appeals reheard the case en bane and reversed the District Courts' judgments. 760 F. 2d 590
(19852;, The court determined that § 702c contained "latent
ambiguities" that could be resolved only by reference to the
legislative history. !d., at 594. Analyzing that history, the
court stated that in enacting § 702c as part of the Flood Control Act of 1928, "Congress was concerned with allocating the
costs of a major public works program between the federal
government and the state and local interests, both public and
private, in the wake of a financial, administrative, and engineering debacle [from the great Mississippi River flood of
1927]." I d., at 596. Departing from the panel's reading of
§ 702's legislative history, the en bane court concluded that
Congress intended § 702c to immunize the Federal Government from liability for damage resulting directly from construction of flood control projects and from liability for flooding caused by factors beyond the Government's control, but
that Congress had not intended "to shield the negligent or
wrongful acts of government employees-either in the construction or in the continued operation" of flood control
projects, including the failure "to warn the public of the
existence of hazards to their accepted use of government-impounded water, or nearby land." !d., at 599, 603.
Judge Gee, in dissent, argued that the holding was contrary to "the statute's plain words," id. , at 604, and that
that "washouts" caused by the rapid runoff of surface water were not
"flood" damage.

l
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"[b]oth the language of § 702c and the legislative history
[were] entirely consistent with a purpose in the Congress,
poised over a half-century ago on the brink of entry into a
massive public works program-one of then unprecedented
scope and laden with foreseeable and unforeseeable prospects
of liability-to state clearly that the federal treasury was to
be placed at risk by it no further than was required by the
Constitution," id., at 605-606. He noted that this construction was the unanimous view of previous Courts of Appeals
that had construed § 702c, and that it "has stood for three
decades without any sign of Congressional dissatisfaction."
ld., at 606. 3
We granted certiorari to resolve the resultant split among
the Circuits. 4 474 U. S. - - (1985). We now reverse.
II
The starting point in statutory interpretation is "the
language of the statute itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concurring). "[W]e assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used." Amer3
Judge Higginbotham filed a separate dissenting opinion stating that
"[w]ithout clear evidence of what Congress meant to do in 1928, I would
defer to the longstanding and unanimous constuction placed on § 702c by
this and other courts .... " 760 F. 2d, at 606-607.
'All other Courts of Appeals that have interpreted § 702c-and, prior to
this case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, seen. 2, supra--have
held that § 702c grants immunity to the Federal Government from damages
caused by flood waters from a flood control project. See, e. g., Portis v.
Folk Construction Co., 694 F. 2d 520, 522 (CAS 1982) (purpose of§ 702c is
"to assure the government of absolute immunity for [damages caused by
flooding related to] flood control projects"); Morici Corp. v. United States,
681 F. 2d 645, 647-648 (CA9 1982) ("if [the plaintiff's] injury resulted from
the operation of [a] federal project for flood control purposes, government
immunity is complete"); Callaway v. United States, 568 F . 2d 684, 686-687
(CAlO 1978) (rejecting arguments that § 702c does not apply to flood damages resulting from the operation of a flood control project in view of
"broad and emphatic language of§ 702c"); Parks v. United States, 370 F.
2d 92, 93 (CA2 1966) (same).
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ican Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 68 (1982). The
immunity provision in § 702c, enacted as part of the Flood
Control Act of 1928, outlines immunity in sweeping terms:
"No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the
United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place." 33 U.S. C. §702c (emphasis added). It
is difficult to imagine broader language. 5
On its face, this language covers the accidents at issue
here. Respondents' injuries occurred as a result of the
release of waters from reservoirs that had reached flood
stage. Given the nature of the accidents at issue, and given
the plain terms of the statute, "it requires some ingenuity to
create ambiguity." Rothschild v. United States, 179 U. S.
463, 465 (1900). Cf. TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 173, n. 18
(1978) (assertions of ambiguity do not transform a clear statute into an ambiguous provision).
Although the Court of Appeals found, for example, that
the word "damage" was ambiguous because it might refer
only to damage to property and exclude damage to persons,
760 F. 2d, at 594, and n. 7, the ordinary meaning of the word
carries no such limitation. Damages "have historically been
awarded both for injury to property and injury to the person-a fact too well-known to have been overlooked by the
Congress .... " American Stevedores, Inc. v. Parella, 330
U. S. 446, 450 (1947). 6 Moreover, Congress' choice of the
5
As Judge Gee noted in dissent, any effort to devise a provision that
more plainly rules out liability "serves small purpose beyond making the
enactment read like an insurance company's fonn [of] general release
rather than a statute." 760 F. 2d 590, 604 (1985). Respondents conceded
as much at oral argument: "I don't believe that [§ 702c] could have been
more expansive ['in its absolute tenns']." Tr. of Oral Arg. 30.
5
Damages means "loss due to ... injury or hann to person, property,
or reputation." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 571 (1961);
Black's Law Dictionary 351 (5th ed. 1979). Damages carried the same
meaning at the time § 702c was enacted. See 4 J. Sutherland, Law of
Damages §§ 1241-1252 (4th ed. 1916); 2 T. Sedgwick, Measure of Damages
§§ 573-574a (9th ed. 1912).
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language "any damage" and "liability of any kind" further
~
undercuts a narrow construction. @nphasis added)
Nor do the terms "flood" and "fl~dwaters" create any uncertainty in the context of accidents such as the ones at issue
in these cases. The Act concerns flood control projects designed to carry flood waters. It is thus clear from § 702c's
plain language that the terms "flood" and "floodwaters" apply
to all waters contained in or carried through a federal flood
control project for purposes of or related to flood control, as
well as to waters that such projects cannot control. As both
District Courts found, the waters here clearly fall within the
ambit of the statute. 7
III
We have repeatedly recognized that "[w ]hen ... the terms
of a statute [are] unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete,
except 'in "rare and exceptional circumstances.""' Rubin v.
United States, 449 U. S. 424, 430 (1981) (citations omitted).
In the absence of a "clearly expressed legislative intention to
the contrary," the language of the statute itself "must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108
(1980). Despite respondents' contentions and the reasoning
of the Court of Appeals, we do not find that the legislative
7
See Morici Corp. v. United States, 681 F. 2d, at 647-648 (no immunity
for flooding if innundation " 'wholly unrelated to any Act of Congress authorizing expenditures of federal funds for flood control, or any act undertaken pursuant to any such authorization'"), quoting Peterson v. United
States, 367 F. 2d 271 (CA9 1966); Hayes v. United States, 585 F. 2d 701,
702-703 (CA4 1978) ("If the plaintiff could prove damage to his farm as a
result of the dam's operation as a recreational facility without relation to
the operation of the dam as a flood control project, he would avoid the absolute bar of § 702c").
We have noted that here the District Courts in each case found that the
waters were being released from federal flood control facilities to prevent
flooding. App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a, 68a. The Court of Appeals upheld
these findings, 760 F. 2d, at 603, and assumed that "the waters in this [consolidated] case were floodwaters." I d., at 594, n. 6.
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history of the statute justifies departure from the plain words
of the statute. Indeed, on balance we think the legislative
history of the Flood Control Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 534, reinforces the plain language of the immunity provision in § 702c.
The Flood Control Act enacted "a comprehensive ten-year
program for the entire [Mississippi River] valley, embodying
a general bank protection scheme, channel stablization and
river regulation, all involving vast expenditures of public
funds." United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U. S. 256, 262
(1939). The Act was the Nation's response to the disastrous
flood in the Mississippi Valley in 1927. That flood resulted in
the loss of nearly 200 lives and more than $200 million in
property damage; almost 700,000 people were left homeless.
S. Rep. No. 619, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1928). The flood
control system in the Mississippi River Valley in response to
this catastrophe was the largest public works project undertaken up to that time in the United States. 8
It is not surprising, in the light of the devastation wrought
by the 1927 flood and the magnitude of Congress' undertaking, that the legislative history of § 702c shows a consistent
concern for limiting the Federal Government's financial liability to expenditures directly necessary for the construction
and operation of the various projects. Numerous statements concerning the immunity provision confirm that it was
intended to reaffirm sovereign immunity in such a dangerous
8

Rep. Snell, Chairman of the House Rules Committee, stated in reporting the rules on debate for the Flood Control Act of 1928:
"(T]he legislation made in order under this rule is the most important matter that has been brought before this House since the declaration of war
about 11 years ago. This legislation provides for the most gigantic undertaking in construction and engineering that any government in the civilized
world has ever undertaken. . . . (I]t is much larger and will cost four
times as much as the Panama Canal. " 69 Cong. Rec. 6640 (1928).
The statute authorized $325 million for the program, Act of May 15, 1928,
ch. 569, § 1, 45 Stat. 534-535, but estimates of the cost of the entire project
ranged past $500 million. H. R. Rep. No. 1100, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 18
(1928).

•
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and extensive project. The Chairman of the House Rules
Committee, in opening the discussion on the rule governing
debate on the 1928 Act, stated:
"I want this bill so drafted that it will contain all the
safeguards necessary for the Federal Government. If
we go down there and furnish protection to these people-and I assume it is a national responsibility-! do
not want to have anything left out of the bill that would
protect us now and for all time to come. I for one do not
want to open up a situation that will cause thousands of
lawsuits for damages against the Federal Government in
the next 10, 20, or 50 years." 69 Cong. Rec. 6641 (1928)
(remarks of Rep. Snell).
A number of other congressmen unequivocally stated that
the United States should not be liable for any expense other
than the direct cost of constructing the project. See id., at
7028 (remarks of Rep. Spearing); id., at 6999-7000 (remarks
of Rep. Frear). 9
These statements show that the sweeping language of
§ 702c was no drafting inadvertence. See National Mfg. Co.
v. United States, 210 F. 2d 263, 270 (CAS), cert. denied, 347
U. S. 967 (1954). Congress clearly sought to ensure beyond
doubt that sovereign immunity would protect the government from "any" liability associated with flood control. As
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explained three
decades ago inNational Mfg., § 702c's language "safeguarded
the United States against liability of any kind for damage
from or by floods or flood waters in the broadest and most
9

Respondents have argued that Congress would not have enacted

§ 702c if it were merely a codification of the Federal Government's sover-

eign immunity. The legislative history refutes this contention. One of
the principal Congressmen in the debates concerning the immunity provision in § 702c remarked: "While it is wise to insert that provision in the bill,
it is not necessary, because the Supreme Court of the United States has
decided ... that the Government is not liable for any of these damages."
69 Cong. Rec. 702~ (1928) (remarks of Rep. Spearing).
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emphatic language." 210 F. 2d, at 270. The equally broad
and emphatic language found in the legislative history shows
that Congress understood what it was saying. We therefore
conclude that the legislative history fully supports attributing to the unambiguous words of the statute their ordinary
meaning.
IV
A
Respondents nevertheless advance several alternative
readings of§ 702c's seemingly clear language.
Respondents Butler and James argue that the immunity
provision of § 702c was enacted to bar claims against the
Government for damages to property that do not rise to the
level of a constitutional taking. The provision, according to
this argument, assured the Federal Government control over
paying for property rights that it acquired under the proviso
of § 702c (authorizing purchase of interests in certain properties bordering the Mississippi River) and under § 702d (authorizing purchase of "flowage rights") by barring claims for
such property rights, except in situations involving a taking
under the Fifth Amendment. Such a reading, it is contended, would still allow recovery for damages to persons or
property not connected with these acquisitions.
We do not agree. Both § 702d and the proviso of § 702c
provide for compensation by the Federal Government for the
acquisition of certain kinds of property rights. We cannot
see why Congress would first determine that these property
rights deserved compenstion, and then in the same statute
give the Federal Government absolute discretion to decide
whether to pay that compensation. Moreover, there is little
in the legislative history that would even colorably support
the proposition that the immunity provision in § 702c was intended to bar only liability for the compensation described in
the proviso and § 702d. Section 702c's immunity provision
and proviso were introduced by different sponsors. 69
Cong. Rec. 7023 (1928). Congress unanimously accepted the

..
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immunity provision, but enacted the proviso only after debate and by a vote of 111-79. Id., at 7023. The debates on
the proviso, which addressed the narrow issue of whether
compensation should be provided to property owners affected
by the construction of levees on the opposite bank of the
river, see id., at 6642, contain no reference to the immunity
provision, see id., at 6642, 7022-7023. Similarly, the debate
on § 702d does not reveal any relationship between that section and the immunity provision in 702c. Id., at 7104-7111.
Finally, and most importantly, the proffered interpretation
of§ 702c ignores the broad language of the statute. If Congress had wished to bar actions for compensation for purchases under § 702c's proviso and § 702d, presumably it would
have done so more specifically.
Respondents Butler and James also argue, in the alternative, that even if § 702c is intended to grant immunity in connection with flood control projects, the Federal Government
is not entitled to immunity here because their injuries arose
from Government employees' alleged mismanagement of recreational activities wholly unrelated to flood control. In support of this argument they point to a "fundamental principle
of immunity" that the "sphere or protected activity must be
narrowly limited by the purpose for which the immunity was
granted." We think, however, that the manner in which to
convey warnings , including the negligent failure to do so, is
part of the "management" of a flood control project. And as
noted n. 7, supra, the Court of Appeals found that the
release of the waters at the Millwood Reservoir and at the
Cortableau Basin was clearly related to flood control. Moreover, the broad principle applicable here is that a "clear relinquishment of sovereign immunity [is required] to give justification for tort actions." Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S.
15, 31 (1953). 10
The cases on which
respondents Butler
and James rely relate to personal
immunity, not to
the Federal Government's sovereign
immunity.

•:

'~ee Brief for Respondents James eta!. 33, citing, inter alia, Harlow v.
Fillgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982); Nixon v. Fitzgerald , 457 U. S. 731 (1982);
Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978).
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B
Respondent Clardy adopts the en bane Court of Appeals'
reading of § 702c: Congress enacted the section to immunize
the Federal Government from liability only for property
damage resulting directly from construction of flood control
projects.
To support this argument, both respondent Clardy and the
Court of Appeals rely on the portion of the legislative history
of§ 702c that concerns the Government's acquisition of property rights. According to the argument, the House of Representatives, where the provision originated, enacted § 702c
solely in response to the Senate version of the Flood Control
Act, which would have created broad remedies for property
owners, offering "[j]ust compensation" for "all property used,
taken, damaged, or destroyed in carrying out the flood control plan." 11 S. 3740, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 54 (1928), 69
Cong. Rec. 5483 (1928). This language would have provided
Respondents Butler and James have also argued that the immunity provision of§ 702c applies only to projects authorized under the 1928 Act, and
therefore does not extend to the Millwood Project. Section 702c is not by
its terms restricted to projects constructed under the 1928 Act. Nor
would it make sense for the Federal Government to have immunity only for
some, but not all, of its flood control projects. We find no merit to this
argument.
"Section 702c, which consists of both the immunity provision at issue
and a proviso, reads:
"No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for
any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place: Provided, however, That if in carrying out the purposes of . . . this title it shall be found
that upon any stretch of the banks of the Mississippi River it is impracticable to construct levees, either because such construction is not economically justified or because such construction would unreasonably restrict the
flood channel, and lands in such stretch of the river are subjected to overflow and damage which are not now overflowed or damaged by reason of
the construction of levees on the opposite banks of the river it shall be the
duty of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Engineers to institute
proceedings on behalf of the United States Government to acquire either
the absolute ownership of the lands so subjected to overflow and damage or
floodage rights over such lands." (Emphasis in original.)
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compensation well beyond the requirements of the Fifth
Amendment's takings clause. It accordingly met with substantial hostility in the House, where members feared it
might "make the railroads" and other large property owners
"a present of many millions of dollars." Id., at 6712 (remarks of Congressman Kopp).
According to respondent Clardy, § 702c was added simply
to counteract this generosity, and to prevent any excess costs
for the acquisition of flowage rights or easements after the
completion of the flood control project. Since none of the
respondents' claims stem from property damage due to
construction of a dam or reservoir, the argument goes,
§ 702c's immunity does not apply, and the government may
be held liable for its failure to warn the public of "the existence of hazards to their accepted use of government-impounded water or nearby land." 760 F. 2d, at 603.
We find no merit to this argument. It is true that during
the debates on the Act, several Congressmen used the terms
"liability" and "damage" to refer only to property damage
caused by the construction of the flood control projects.
But, as we have noted above, there are numerous passages in
the legislative history that emphasize the intention of Congress to protect the Federal Government from any damages
liability that might arise out of flood control. Supra, at
~.
We think that the "fragments of legislative history"
on which respondent Clardy and the Court of Appeals relied
fall far short of amounting "to a clearly expressed legislative
intent contrary to the plain language of the statute." American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S., at 75.

9-11

v
As the facts in this case demonstrate, one can well understand why the Court of Appeals sought to find a principled
way to hold the Government responsible for its concededly
negligent conduct. But our role is to effectuate Congress'
intent, and Congress rarely speaks more plainly than it has in

..

85-434-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. JAMES

15

the prov1s10n we apply here. If that provision is to be
changed, it should be by Congress and not by this Court.
We therefore follow the plain language of § 702c, a section of
the 1928 Act that received careful consideration by Congress
and that has remained unchanged for nearly sixty years, and
hold that the Federal Government is immune from suit in
these cases. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit is accordingly reversed.
It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA'rES
No. 85-434
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v.
CHARLOTTE JAMES ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1986]

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
As a part of the major undertaking authorized by the Mississippi Flood Control Act of 1928, Congress directed the
Secretary of War and the Chief of Engineers to take special
steps to acquire lands that were subject to "overflow damage" along the banks of the Mississippi River where it was
impracticable to construct levees. In the section of the Act
containing that specific direction concerning the acquisition of
"lands so subject to overflow damage," there is a sentence
stating that "[n]o liability of any kind shall attach to or rest
upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or
flood waters at any place." 1
'Section 3 of the statute, which is now codified as 33 U. S. C. § 702c,
reads in full as follows :
·
"Sec. 3. Except when authorized by the Secretary of War upon the recommendation of the Chief of Engineers, no money appropriated under authority of this Act shall be expended on the construction of any item of the
project until the States or levee districts have given assurances satisfactory to the Secretary of War that they will (a) maintain all flood-control
works after their completion, except controlling and regulating spillway
structures, including special relief levees; maintenance includes normally
such matters as cutting grass, removal of weeds, local drainage , and minor
repairs of main river levees; (b) agree to accept land turned over to them
under the provisions of section 4; (c) provide without cost to the United
States, all rights of way for levee foundations and levees on the main stem
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According to the Court, Congress intended by this section
to immunize the Federal Government from liability for any
claim for personal injury, even though Congress provided expressly for compensation for property damage in excess of
that required by the Constitution. 2 In my view, neither the
plain language of the statute nor the legislative history behind it support imputing such a perverse design to the Legislature. In my opinion, this provision applies only to property damage, and the judgment below should be affirmed. 3
Section 3 absolves the United States of liability for any
"damage" by floods or flood waters. The word "damage"
traditionally describes a harm to property (hence, "property
damage"), rather than harm to the person (i. e., "personal
injury"). As Chief Judge Cockburn explained in Smith v.
Brown, 40 L. J. Q. B. (n. s.) 214, 218 (1871):
"The question is whether a personal injury occasioned by
the collision of two vessels comes under the term 'damof the Mississippi River between Cape Girardeau, Missouri, and the Head
of Passes.
"No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for
any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place: Provided, however, That if in carrying out the purposes of this Act it shall be found that
upon any stretch of the banks of the Mississippi River it is impracticable to
construct levees, either because such construction is not economically justified or because such construction would unreasonably restrict the flood
channel, and lands in such stretch of the river are subjected to overflow
and damage which are not now overflowed or damaged by reason of the
construction of levees on the opposite banks of the river it shall be the duty
of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Engineers to institute proceedings
on behalf of the United States Government to acquire either the absolute
ownership of the lands so subjected to overflow and damage or floodage
rights over such lands." 45 Stat. 535-536.
2
Congress rejected an amendment to § 3 to provide only such compensation as would be required by the Constitution-a measure that Congress
thought excluded flowage rights. See 69 Gong. Rec. 7104-7111, 7122
(1928).
3
My reading of the statute and its legislative history also persuades me
that the immunity provision has no application to any other flood control
project.
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age' as used in the 7th section. Now the words used are
undoubtedly very extensive, but it is to be observed that
neither in common parlance nor in legal phraseology is
the word 'damage' used as applicable to injuries done to
the person, but solely as applicable to mischief done to
property. Still less is this term applicable to loss of life
or injury resulting therefrom, to a widow or surviving
relative. We speak indeed of 'damages' as compensation for injury done to the person, but the term 'damages' is not employed interchangeably with the term 'injury,' with reference to mischief wrongfully occasioned
to the person. . . . [T]his distinction is not a matter of
mere verbal criticism, but is of a substantial character
and necessary to be attended to . . . . "
See Seward v. The Owners ofthe Vera Cruz, 54 L. J. P. D. &
A. 9, 13 (1884) (Lord Chancellor); Simpson v. Blues, 41
L. J. C. P. (n. s.) 121, 128 (1872). This understanding of
"damage" was not peculiar to English common law courts,
but was the preferred definition found in legal dictionaries
and in legal encyclopedias in use in the United States at the
time Congress drafted the Mississippi Flood Control Act in
1928. See, e. g., Bouvier's Law Dictionary 749 (3d rev.
1914); 15 Am. Jur., Damages§ 2, p. 388 (1938) ("A distinction
is to be noted between the word 'damage' and 'damages.'
'Damage' is defined to be the loss, injury, or deterioration
caused by negligence, design, or accident of one person to another in respect of the latter's personal property, whereas
'damages' signifies compensation in money for the loss or
damage" (emphasis added)); 17 C. J., Damage 698 (1919) ("It
has been held that neither in common parlance nor in legal
phraseology is the word [damage] used as applicable to injuries done to the person, but solely as applicable to mischief
done to property; and, although we speak of damages as compensation for injury done to the person, yet the term is not
employed interchangeably with the term 'injury,' with reference to mischief wrongfully occasioned to the person; but

..
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there is authority to the effect that the term 'damage' includes personal injuries; and where the context shows that
damage means personal injury, the term will be so
construed").
Because the preferred definition of "damage" in 1928 excluded harm to the person, one would think that the Courtin accordance with the "plain meaning" of § 3--would construe the immunity provision to bar liability only for property
damage. Surprisingly, the Court reaches precisely the opposite conclusion. Its analysis, however, relies entirely on
authorities which define "damages"-or the monetary remedy imposed on one found liable for a legal wrong-rather
than "damage"-which is the term Congress employed to
identify the liability from which the Federal Government was
thereafter excused. It is therefore quite beside the point
that "damages" have "'historically been awarded both for injury to property and injury to the person." Ante, at 7 (quoting American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U. S. 446, 450
(1947)), for the statute bars liability for "damage," not "damages." Indeed, the Court's own authorities, see ante, at 7
and n. 5, distinguish between the two terms:
"It might be noted here that there is a distinction between damage and damages. Black's law Dictionary
cautions that the word 'damage,' meaning 'Loss, injury,
or deterioration,' is 'to be distinguished from its plural,"damages,"-which means a compensation in money for a
loss or damage."' American Stevedores v. Porello, 330
U. 8., at 450, n. 6. 4
'The treatises on damages on which the Court relies likewise subscribe
to this definition of "damages," see 1 T. Sedgwick, Measure of Damages
§ 29 (9th ed. 1912); 1 J. Sutherland, Law of Damages § 2, p. 4 (4th ed.
1916); id. , § 12, p. 46, and the distinction between the two words appears
to have been universally observed, see, e. g., 15 Am. Jur., Damages § 2,
p. 388; 8 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 535 (2d ed. 1898); W.
Hale, Law of Damages 9, 12-13 (2d ed. 1912). In fact, the authorities
cited by the Court support the traditional interpretation of "damage"; for
example, in the index to his treatise Mr. Sedgwick refers to "damage" only
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The Court thus provides no basis for thinking that Congress
used "damage" other than in its common, preferred usage to
mean property damage. If "plain meaning" is our polestar,
the immunity provision does not bar respondents' personal
injury suits.
The remainder of the statute and its legislative history
similarly provide no basis for assuming that Congress used
"damage" to bar liability for personal injuries. The text of
§ 3---indeed, the text of the entire Mississippi Flood Control
Act of 1928--contains no reference to personal injury.
Moreover, when the sentence beginning "[n]o liability" is
read together with the proviso which is appended to it, it is
most readily understood as relating to the kind of harm that
the paragraph as a whole describes-namely, the harm to
"land subject to overflow damage." As the text of§ 3 of the
Act plainly states, see n. 1, supra, the Federal Government
assumed certain responsibilities for areas in which the construction of levees was not practicable. Given that specific
and limited undertaking, the sentence limiting liability is best
understood as making it clear that the Federal Government
accepted no additional responsibilities and did not intend to
create a new federal judicial remedy for failing to carry out
its undertaking. Indeed, a claim that the 1928 Act created a
new federal remedy for property damage was advanced and
rejected in United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U. S. 256,
269-270 (1939). Thus, the text of§ 3 read as a whole irresistibly implies that the sentence in question was intended
merely to place a limit on the potential liability of the United
States that might otherwise have arisen from the direction to
the Secretary of the War and the Chief of Engineers concerning overflow damage to land. 5
when referring to property damage. See 4 T. Sedgwick, supra,
p. 3160-3162.
' The Court, see ante, at 11-12, is simply wrong in intimating that the
immunity sentence and its proviso were dissociated from each other during
their consideration before Congress. The Court's observation that the im-
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The legislative history of the statute is entirely consistent
with this reading. It was a response, not only to the disastrous flood of 1927, but to the perennial threat to landowners
in the alluvial valley of the Mississippi River posed by recurrent floods since at least 1717. See United States v.
Sponenbarger, 308 U. S., at 260-262. During the lengthy
hearings and debates on the 1928 legislation, there was extensive discussion of the allocation of the cost of property
damage, both past and future, among private interests, local
governmental entities, and the Federal Government. See
ante, at 9-11 (quoting estimates of the costs of construction
and acquisition of property). There was no discussion that I
have been able to find concerning potential liability for personal injuries. If Congress meant to include personal injury
"damage" in the immunity conferred by § 3, one would expect
to find some explanation why it authorized extraconstitumunity provision and the proviso were sponsored by different Congressmen is only trivially true: the proviso was offered by Representative Garrett of Tennessee as an amendment to the immunity provision, which was
itself a pending amendment·, sponsored by Representative Reid of Illinois,
to the bill before the House of Representatives. 69 Cong. Rec. 7022
(1928). The sponsor of the proviso, Representative Garrett, offered his
amendment as an amendment to the immunity provision before it was accepted by the House of Representatives. Ibid. In explaining the reason
for this, Representative Garrett underscored the symbiotic relationship
between the immunity provision and the proviso:
"Mr. Chairman, I am inclined to agree with the gentleman from Illinois
[Mr. MADDEN] that the amendment which the gentleman from Illinois
[Mr. REID] has proposed more properly would come in another section,
but if it is to come now it seems to me that my amendment will have to
come in connection with it at this place. I do not want to lose any rights in
connection with it." Ibid. (emphasis added).
A short while later, the House passed Representative Garrett's amendment adding the proviso to the amendment containing the immunity provision. !d., at 7023. Immediately thereafter, the House agreed to "the
amendment of the gentleman from Illinois as amended by the amendment
ofthe gentlemanfrom Tennessee." Ibid. (remarks of the Chairman) (emphasis added). The immunity provision and the proviso were thus considered and passed as a package.

'•
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tional compensation for property damage but nothing for personal injury. The expected explanation is nowhere to be
found.
Construing the immunity sentence as a limit on the compensation authorized in § 3 also avoids rendering that sentence superfluous. The 70th Congress had no reason to
enact a special statute to protect the Federal Government
from tort liability for personal injuries for the simple reason
that another decade and a half was to pass before Congress
enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946 6 and "put aside
its sovereign armor in cases where federal employees have
tortiously caused personal injury or property damage." 7 It
is quite unrealistic to assume that in 1928, Congress enacted
a special provision to avoid a liability from which it was already immune. 8
60 Stat. 812, 842-847.
American Stevedores, Inc. v. Parella, 330 U. S., at 453. It is interesting to note that in the Tort Claims Act itself, Congress repeatedly referred
in the alternative to claims "on account of damage to a loss of property or
on account of personal injury or death," see 60 Stat. 843, 845-846.
Revealingly, the Committee Reports on the Act did not understand
there to be any bar to liability for personal injuries resulting from flood
control projects:
"This is a highly important exception, intended to preclude any possibility
that the bill might be construed to authorize suit for damages against the
Government growing out of an authorized activity, such as a flood control
or irrigation project, where no negligence on the part of any Government
agent is shown." Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 29, n. 21 (1953)
(quoting H. R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 10 (1942); S. Rep.
No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7 (1942); H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 5-6 (1946)).
8
This construction is also consistent with 58 years of decisional law.
The statute the Court construes today has been on the books for more than
half a century, but prior to this case there appears to be no reported decision in which the Government successfully asserted it as a defense to a personal injury claim. See 760 F. 2d 590, 599, n. 16 (CA5 1985). It has been
repeatedly and successfully invoked in property damage litigation, but the
application of the statute that the Court upholds today is completely unprecedented. Given the number and the size of Federal' Flood Control
6
7
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It would be regrettable but obligatory for this Court to
construe the immunity provision to bar personal injury claims
if such was the intent of Congress. But when a critical term
in the statute suggests a more limited construction, and when
the congressional debates are not only consistent with this
construction but nowhere reveal a recognition, let alone an
intention, that it would deprive those injured by governmental negligence of any remedy, duty compels the contrary
conclusion. It defies belief-and ascribes to the Members of
Congress a perverse, even barbaric, intent-to think that
they spent days debating the measure of extraconstitutional
compensation they would provide riparian landowners but ·intended-without a single word of dissent-to condemn the
widows, orphans, and injured tort victims of negligent operation of flood control projects to an irrational exclusion from
the protection of the subsequently enacted Tort Claims Act.
I respectfully dissent.

projects throughout our great Nation, and given the fact that the kind of
recreational use disclosed by this record is fairly common, it is telling that,
until today's decision, immunity had never been upheld in defense to such a
claim.
·
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In
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persons were sucked through the retaining structures.
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under the Torts Claim Act against the United
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Section 702(c) of

the statute that authorized federal flood control
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as not applying to negligent or wrongful acts of
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It is well to remember / that our role is to
effectuate the intent of Congress, / and Congress rarely
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has remained unchanged for nearly 60 years.

We reverse

the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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